

**00096**

**1961/04/06**

3741

FC 371/15614.0

COPYRIGHT NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION

~~SECRET~~RECEIVED FROM HAVANA TO FOREIGN OFFICE  
AT 11 AM

Cypher/CIP

7 APR 1961

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Marchant

No. 267  
April 6, 1961, D.5.16 p.m. April 6, 1961  
R.3.30 a.m. April 7, 1961IMMEDIATE~~SECRET~~

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 267 of April 6.  
 Repeated for information to: Washington Rio de Janeiro  
 Personal to Governor Jamaica  
 Personal to Governor Nassau  
 Personal Governor-General West Indies  
 Guard.

rumours of imminent landings by exiled Cubans are more persistent now among local counter-revolutionary circles than ever before. Preparations by exiles in Guatemala, Panama, etc., have been reported prominently in the local Press. There have been an increased number of arrests. There are, however, no signs of increased military precautions, at least, in the Havana area.

2. Vacco da Cunha, former Ambassador in Havana and now Secretary-General to Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs, paid one day visit to Cuba last weekend after leaving Jamaica. French colleague, who has close contact with him, told me in confidence that da Cunha also thinks landings will take place this month. He believes later will be too late because of the speed with which Cuba is being sucked into the Sino-Soviet orbit. According to my informant he nevertheless made a further bid for peaceful solution when in a two hour talk with Castro he suggested that a Cuban-United States relationship could be worked out on the same basis as Finland-U.S.S.R., i.e. neighbours with different political structure but with no bloc alliances. Castro was reportedly unenthusiastic.

/3. Prospect

~~SECRET~~

3741

E 371/156140

SECRETHavana telegram No. 267 to Foreign Office.

-2-

3. Prospect of badly organised landings planned on the assumption that internal opposition is strong enough to give decided support continues to cause considerable concern to me and to all my European colleagues. \* Of the American assessment is based exclusively on counter-revolutionary sources it is almost certainly wrong. Whilst European colleagues differ over the exact strength of the opposition, all agree that over hasty, over optimistic miscalculations by exiles would be certain to produce bloodshed and possibly protracted civil war.

4. The risks of waiting until the plum is ripe are admittedly great since the machinery of repression and indoctrination grows stronger each month. On the other hand, I have been conscious for the first time during the last few weeks of indications that the revolution may be losing momentum. The hate theme against "Yanqui Imperialism" has been played down since Kennedy's presidency, and, in any case, lost much of its dynamism when the United States Embassy and colony left Cuba in January. I more than have the impression that pro-Sino/Soviet bloc propagandists have overplayed their hand somewhat of late, causing misgivings among up to now enthusiastic elements.

5. Defection of Pedro Llada (my Chancery letter 1011/61 of March 30) and recent need for housewives to queue for certain essentials are contributing factors to what I interpret as the beginning of slowing down of the revolutionary impetus. This may be merely a passing phase, but on the other hand in Cuban climate the rot is said to set in fast.

Foreign Office pass Immediate to Washington and Routine to Rio de Janeiro as my telegrams Nos. 66 and 5 respectively.

[Repeated as requested]

DISTRIBUTED TO:

American Department  
Information Policy Department  
Information Research Department  
News Department

ADVANCE COPIES:

Lord Privy Seal  
Sir R. Stevens  
Mr. MacBermot  
Head of American Department

VVVV

SECRET